Northern … rms with patented technology can export goods to Southern markets and incur tari¤ costs or choose FDI and avoid the tari¤. We examine the welfare e¤ects of intellectual property protection under this scenario. When it is bene… tial to do so, South o¤ers a patent protection to induce FDI. We show that a technological improvement in the North can reduce South' s welfare. After a technological improvement, the South still prefers that North does FDI, however a longer patent protection may be required to induce FDI which can result in an overall decrease of South' s welfare. We also show that a more e¤ective technology does not necessarily require a longer patent protection to induce FDI. JEL Classi… cation: O14, O33, O34, F13, F23.
Introduction
One of the primary bene… ts of foreign direct investment (FDI) for developing countries is its association with technology transfer. For the host country, the bene… ts of technology transfer are not limited to access to new goods or lower prices for consumers but also extend to domestic … rms through the dissemination of cost reducing technologies through learning and imitation. In an attempt to capture these bene… ts, developing countries have sought to tailor policies to attract FDI and increase technology transfer. This paper investigates the welfare e¤ects of technology improvements when Southern countries use intellectual property protection and tari¤s to in ‡ uence technology transfer and FDI.
In our paper, Northern … rms with patented technology can export goods to Southern markets and incur tari¤ costs or choose FDI and avoid the tari¤. We examine the welfare e¤ects of intellectual property protection under this scenario. When it is bene… cial to do so, South o¤ers a patent protection to induce FDI. We consider technological change which impacts the marginal costs of production and thus a¤ects the choice of the quantities to be produced. We show that a more e¤ective technology does not necessarily require a longer patent protection to induce FDI. We … nd that technology improvements can in ‡ uence the choice of FDI and IPRs in ways which may be immiserizing for Southern countries: a technological improvement in the North can reduce South' s welfare. After a technological improvement, the South still prefers that North does FDI, however a longer patent protection may be required to induce FDI which can result in an overall decrease of South' s welfare.
Our paper is related to a body of literature on FDI and technology transfer which looks at policies other than intellectual property rights. Matoo et al (2004) consider a Northern … rm' s choice between FDI and acquisition of domestic … rms and … nd that when technology transfer is costly, the interaction between scale and competition e¤ects provides incentives for Southern governments to limit the degree of foreign ownership. In a similar vein Brander and Spencer, 1987 , Hau ‡ er and Wooton, 1999 and Fumagalli, 2003 study the welfare e¤ects of tax and tari¤ policies on FDI and host country welfare. and Deardor¤, 1993) . There is also an existing literature which studies the positive impact of IPRs on technology transfer. (Taylor, 1993 , Vishwasrao, 1994 , and Zigic, 1998 . On the other hand, Saggi (2002a, 2002b ), in a model with endogenous innovation and imitation show that tighter IPRs in the South can crowd out FDI and reduce innovation because of resources wasting 1 . Arguments that IPRs a¤ect the FDI decision enjoy theoretical as well as empirical support. Ferrantino (1993) … nds that multinationals … rms will prefer to locate production where IPRs are well recognized. In addition, Ferrantino also … nds a tendency for U.S. … rms to have higher transfer exports to its a¢liates in countries that do not protect IPRs possibly in an attempt to conceal production technology. Lee and Mans… eld (1996) using survey data from U.S. multinationals show that di¤erences in intellectual property regimes have a signi… cant impact on the volume and composition of FDI. Lower levels of intellectual property protection tend to reduce the volume of FDI and also the funds invested in R&D facilities in the host countries.
We construct a model which captures some of these features. In our model, a Northern … rm chooses whether to service a Southern market through exports or FDI. FDI has the bene… cial e¤ect of avoiding the Southern tari¤ on imported goods but exposes the … rm to the risk of imitation by Southern rivals. We assume that locating in a Southern country is necessary for imitation. We can think of this as a situation where imitation is costly and where FDI in the South lowers the costs of imitation perhaps because the technology has already been adapted for use in the South 2 . The Southern government can prevent 1 In contrast with most other papers, in the Glass and Saggi model, better IPR protection in the South does not o¤er any special bene… ts to multinationals as opposed to importers thus tighter IPR protection tends to shift production to the North and reduces resources available for innovation. 
where   0 denotes the optimized ‡ ow rate of pro… ts of the Northern … rm in the Southern market when it supplies the Southern market through exports and when the per unit tari¤ is  .
If the Northern … rm chooses FDI and sets a subsidiary in the South, it can sell whatever quantity it wishes without having to pay the tari¤. Patent protection in the South, for the Northern … rm that chooses FDI, lasts for a period of time   Until patents expire, the Northern … rm' s subsidiary has a monopoly in the Southern market and at  , Southern … rms are able to reproduce the Northern … rm' s technology and generate the maximum welfare possible and the Northern … rm' s pro… ts are zero 3 . Production in the South is studied is the scope of patents rather than the length. 3 The market in the South may be perfectly competitive after patents expire or may be imperfectly competitive. For the results to hold, we only require that there are some gains to domestic consumers after patents expire and that the Northern … rm' s pro… ts are lower. 0 . This di¤erence in pro… ts and the decision to do FDI is then solely motivated by a more pro… table environment to supply the Southern market from the South due, for example, to low wages in the South or high transportation costs.
In establishing condition (1) we implicitly assumed that the sunk-cost of setting-up the plant is zero. This assumption is made for simplicity: our results would not be qualitatively changed if we considered a positive sunk-cost. Note however that we do not assume that the … xed costs of operating the plant, or quasi-… xed costs are zero. Quasi … xed costs are costs that do not depend on the level of production but are incurred only when the … rm produces a positive quantity of output: maintenance and operating expenses that are incurred regardless of the production level but can be avoided when (see for example Varian (2002) ). For simplicity we focus on quasi-… xed costs and assume the sunk-cost is zero, and in the remainder of the paper the term … xed costs will refer to quasi … xed costs.
Let   denote the present value of the stream of social welfare enjoyed in the South if the Northern … rm chooses to export. We have:
where   0 denotes the ‡ ow rate of social welfare in the South when the Northern … rm supplies the Southern market through exports and when the per unit tari¤ is   Let   denote the present value of the stream of social welfare enjoyed in the South if the Northern … rm chooses to do FDI. We have
where  
Combining (1) and (3) gives that South prefers FDI and North chooses FDI
Other textbooks in microeconomics, managerial economics or industrial organization use di¤erent terminology such as operating or avoidable … xed costs to refer to quasi … xed costs (see for example
Carlton and Perlo¤ (2005)). For more details see Wang and Yang (2001) . 5 The South prefers exports and the North chooses exports when 1 ¡ 
c o m
The condition 4 is intuitive: if the patent length is too long South no longer has an incentive to attract FDI and when the patent length is too short the Northern … rm … nds the FDI option unattractive.
We note that for the range of patent of length that makes FDI mutually attractive compared to the export option is non-empty i¤
In the case of a linear demand and an a¢ne cost function we show that for a signi… cant set of parameters 6 this inequality holds and therefore the interval of patent lengths such that FDI is mutually bene… cial to both parties is not empty.
Technological improvement
A technological improvement in this paper is represented by the reduction in the cost function it creates. It can alternatively be seen as a modi… cation in the pro… ts that depend on the quantity produced 7 . Let denote the quantity produced, we consider technological improvements that result in an increase in the pro… ts by  where ¸0
This technology improvement can be viewed as a decrease in marginal cost.
The central question of this paper is: Will the South always bene… t from a technolog-
We consider the case where the South prefers FDI to export and can modify its patent length to always o¤er the minimum patent length, denoted   ( ), that induces the North- 6 A set of parameters of positive measure where the parameters are the choke price, the slope of the demand function, the … xed cost and the marginal cost. 7 We assume that the quality of the commodity is not a¤ected by the change in technology. . To answer our main question we need to determine the impact of a technological improvement on the minimum FDI inducing patent length.
The minimum FDI inducing patent length
Given a tari¤ rate and a patent length  , the Northern … rm will choose to do FDI instead of exporting if
which after simpli… cation yields
where  Proof: We show in Appendix A that
The lemma above raises a rather surprising possibility: if ³ 
The impact of a technological innovation on South' s welfare
To be able to compute the overall impact of the technology improvement on the South' s welfare we use speci… c functional forms for the demand function and the cost function.
We argue that a technological improvement can have a negative e¤ect of South' s welfare.
This possibility can arise even in the very standard framework where the demand and the cost are respectively a¢ne functions of the quantity consumed and produced. This is the case we consider from now on. Suppose South' s demand for the commodity produced by the Northern … rm is given by:
The marginal cost 9 is constant and equal to 0 and the … xed cost is ¸0 Assume now that a technological innovation took place and the marginal cost drops from to  ¡  , where ·  . The pro… t maximizing quantity chosen by the Northern … rm during an export phase when it is paying a per unit tari¤ is given by:
where ´(0) ¡ is assumed positive 10 . The Northern … rm' s pro… ts are
from which we infer
9
We assume identical costs in North and South. Our analysis can be extended to cases where the marginal cost   in South and a marginal cost   in North di¤er (  6 =   ).
10
In the case of a linear cost function our analysis could be expressed as a comparative static exercise with respect to the marginal cost   We keep our approach of using the parameter to be consistent with the analysis of the FDI inducing patent length conducted without assuming the linearity of the cost function. 
c o m
The South' s instantaneous social welfare under FDI is given by
The maximum social welfare that can be generated in the South once patent protection expires is
where
Using Lemma 1, we show in appendix B that a decrease in the marginal cost will require a longer patent protection in South to induce FDI from North.
Let   ( ) denote the present value of South' s welfare,
Deriving   ( ) with respect to yields
We have
, moreover, using the envelope theorem we have
does not depend explicitly on   however it depends on   which is a function of  . 
The impact of such a cost reduction is fairly intuitive. The … rst two terms of the RHS are both positive and represent the increased welfare during the period of FDI because production will increase during FDI and, the increase in welfare " post FDI"after the expiration of the patent. The third term' s sign is ambiguous and depends on the impact of the technology improvement. If the minimum FDI inducing patent length is shortened then the impact of the technology improvement is de… nitely positive (since
. If the patent protection is lengthened then the third term' s sign is negative and the impact of the technology improvement on South' s welfare is ambiguous.
For the linear demand and a¢ne cost function as speci… ed above we have:
After substitution of   and   we have at = 0
The impact on South' s welfare due to a change in the marginal cost is
Proof: See appendix C.
Without loss of generality we adopt the following normalization: = 1. The function
The sign of we … rst specify its domain of de… nition. We note that any tari¤ rate must not be larger than 1 (for production to take place 13 ). Moreover, given a tari¤ · 1 we must have
where   represents the upper bound on the … xed costs 14 beyond which, when = 0 there would be losses from export (  0) when the tari¤ is  . We therefore limit the domain of the function
Proposition 3 : A lower marginal cost of production can result in a lower welfare in
South.
Proof: See appendix D.
A lower marginal cost of production can reduce welfare in South. More generally, it can be shown that there exists ¹ 2 (0 1) such that for any 2 (0 ¹  ) a lower marginal cost of production can result in a lower welfare in South and for 2 (¹   1) a lower marginal cost of production always result in a higher welfare in South. The approximate value of ¹ is 0 1885.
The intuition behind the results above is that a change in technology modi… es the ratio of pro… ts under exports and with FDI, 
Conclusion
We … nd that a more e¤ective technologies may not always be necessitate longer patent length in order to induce FDI. Since the Northern … rm is more likely to choose FDI when the cost reduction is more e¤ective over large scale production, if a … rm has sharply increasing marginal costs, then the patent length o¤ered by the South could potentially be shorter and still promote FDI and result in a higher welfare in South. In the case of a linear demand and a¢ne cost function, we show that a decrease of the marginal cost unambiguously requires o¤ering a longer protection. 
